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VAT and International Trade’s Crossroads: Right, Left
or Straight On?
Madeleine Merkx*, Naomie Verbaan** & Rianne Starkenburg***
The current VAT system for intra EU B2B is susceptible to fraud. This is one of the main reasons why the European Commission has
tabled a proposal for a definitive VAT system based on the destination principle. On the other hand, there are Member States that
want to introduce a general reverse charge mechanism in the fight against VAT fraud. While the definitive VAT system proposed by
the European Commission taxes all supplies in the supply chain, the general reverse charge mechanism has the opposite effect. Under
this mechanism effective collection of VAT is postponed to the last link in the supply chain. In this article, the authors evaluate both
systems as well as the current system to assess which system is best.
1 INTRODUCTION
Since the transitional system came into force in 1993,
several attempts have been made to design a definitive
system for cross-border transactions. Initially, the objective
was to introduce a definitive system based on the principle
of taxation in the country of origin.1 However, in 2011 the
conclusion was drawn that this was politically unachievable
and the origin principle was abandoned in favour of the
principle of taxation in the country of destination.2 Several
ways to implement the destination principle have been
identified and evaluated.3 This research solely focused on
the business to business (B2B) supplies of goods, as the
place of supply rules for the B2B supply of services were
brought in line with the destination principle in 2010.4 The
European Commission presented the outcome of this
research in its VAT action plan.5 In October 2017 the
European Commission presented the main aspects of the
new rules for B2B supplies6 followed by detailed rules in
May 2018.7 The main feature of this system is that all
transactions will eventually8 result in a VAT amount to be
paid to the tax authorities. The proposed destination based
system has already been criticized in literature.9 In this
article we compare the proposed definitive system with
the current system and the general reverse charge mechan-
ism. This general reverse charge mechanism can be tem-
porarily implemented by some Member States.10 The
option was introduced upon request of some EU Member
States, in particular the Czech Republic that has already
requested to apply this temporary general reverse charge
mechanism. The main result of this system is that no VAT
will be received by the tax authorities until the last link in
the supply chain. So we are indeed at a VAT cross roads:
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1 First Council Directive 67/227/EEC and Second Council Directive
67/228/EEC of 11 Apr. 1967. This objective is still included in Art.
402 of the Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 Nov. 2006.
2 Communication on the Future of VAT COM (2011) 851 final, at 5.
3 European Commission, Green Paper On the future of VAT Towards
a simpler, more robust and efficient VAT system, Brussels, 1 Dec.
2010, COM(2010) 695 final; VAT Expert Group, VEG No. 004,
First meeting – 24 Oct. 2012, taxud.c.1(2012)1329567; European
Commission, Implementing the ‘destination principle’ to intra-EU
B2B supplies of goods, Feasibility and economic evaluation study,
Final Report, 30 June 2015; European Commission, Commission
staff working document impact assessment accompanying the
document Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive
2006/112/EC as regards harmonizing and simplifying certain
rules in the value added tax system and introducing the definitive
system for the taxation of trade between Member States, Brussels, 4
Oct. 2017, SWD(2017) 325 final.
4 VAT Expert Group, VEG No. 004, first meeting – 24 Oct. 2012,
taxud.c.1(2012)1329567, at 4.
5 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to
the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic
and Social Committee on an action plan on VAT, Towards a single
EU vat area - Time to decide, Brussels, 7 Apr. 2016, COM(2016)
148 final.
6 Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2006/112/EC
as regards harmonizing and simplifying certain rules in the value
added tax system and introducing the definitive system for the
taxation of trade between Member States, 4 Oct. 2017, COM
(2017) 569 final.
7 Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2006/112/EC
as regards the introduction of the detailed technical measures for
the operation of the definitive VAT system for the taxation of trade
between Member States, 25 May 2018, COM (2018) 329 final.
8 As a temporary measure the VAT will be reverse charged to
Certified Taxable Persons (CTPs), see s. 3.2.
9 Madeleine Merkx, John Gruson, Naomie Verbaan & Bart van der
Doef, Definitive VAT Regime: Stairway to Heaven or Highway to Hell?,
27(2) EC Tax Rev. 74–82 and Gorka Echevarría Zubeldia, Definitive
VAT Regime … Really?, 29(4) Int’l VAT Monitor (2018).
10 Council Directive (EU) 2018/2057 of 20 Dec. 2018 amending
Directive 2006/112/EC on the common system of value added tax
as regards the temporary application of a generalized reverse charge
mechanism in relation to supplies of goods and services above a
certain threshold, OJ 2018, L 329/3.
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complete taxation of domestic and cross-border supplies as
the European Commission proposes or effectively only
taxation in the last link of the supply chain as some EU
Member States propose. Or should we continue the current
system? In this article we address all these options. We test
the systems in sections 3 and 4 using the following princi-
ples: taxation in the country of consumption, neutrality,
simplicity, cash flow neutrality, easy to audit and fraud
proof (described in section 2). Most of these principles
are important when adopting new tax legislation, some
especially for VAT. VAT fraud in particular is a big problem
within intra EU B2B trade.11 A new system should there-
fore contribute to limiting this VAT fraud. We will end the
article with a summarized comparison and a conclusion in
section 5.
2 PRINCIPLES
2.1 Taxation in the Country of Consumption
VAT is a general tax on consumption (Article 1 (2) VAT
Directive). As such, its objective is to tax all private con-
sumption. The tax should accrue to the country where the
consumption takes place. This principle can be found in
the legislative history of the VAT Directive12 as well as the
guidance from international organizations.13 The place of
supply rules are the provisions that are responsible for
achieving the goal of taxation in the country of consump-
tion. Proxies are used to achieve that goal. With the
exception of the rule that allows Member States to tax
certain services at the place of their use and enjoyment
(Article 59a VAT Directive), place of supply rules use
proxies such as, the place where the transport of the
goods ends, the place where the customer is established.
But also the place where the supplier is established and
the place where the transport of the goods starts or the
goods are located at the time of supply can be proxies to
achieve the objective of taxation in the country of destina-
tion, when it is common knowledge that consumption
regularly takes place at that place (e.g. when an immova-
ble property is supplied it will be used at the place it is
located).
2.2 Neutrality
The principle of fiscal neutrality is one of the pillars of
the VAT system.14 Therefore, this principle is mentioned
several times in the Preamble of the VAT Directive.15
However, it is not a rule of primary law, but more a
principle of interpretation, to be applied concurrently
with other VAT principles.16
There are different types of neutrality. In international
trade, the so-called external neutrality is particularly
important. External neutrality entails that the tax levied
on importation should be equal to the amount of tax
levied on the same supplies in a domestic situation. Also,
the refund on exportation should be equal to the amount
of tax that has been levied domestically.17 In the inter-
national context it is also of great importance that, with
respect to the level of taxation, foreign businesses should
not be disadvantaged nor advantaged compared to
domestic businesses in the jurisdiction where the tax
may be due or paid. A neutral VAT system has to ensure
there is no unfair competitive advantage afforded to
domestic businesses which may otherwise discourage
international trade and limit consumer choices. Goods
have to be subject to the same VAT legislation regardless
of their origin. This is achieved by the application of the
destination principle.18
2.3 Simplicity
When levying VAT, the practical feasibility must also be
taken into account. VAT collection should not be more
complicated than necessary for the entrepreneur who is
obliged to pay the VAT to the tax authorities. However,
(administrative) simplicity is not an objective in itself. It
does not stand alone, so it must always be seen in
relation to other principles.19
A recent study conducted by Ernst & Young for the
European Commission concludes that the costs asso-
ciated with complying with cross-border VAT obliga-
tions are 11% higher than the VAT compliance costs
associated with domestic trade. This is likely to be due
to the more complicated nature of cross-border VAT
compliance compared to domestic VAT compliance.
High costs and obligations associated with cross-border
VAT compliance can deter businesses from engaging in
intra-EU trade, which can have significant implications
for levels of trade across the EU as a whole.20 It also
turns out that VAT obligations are particularly burden-
some for businesses that are small given that they operate
with more limited resources than large enterprises,
11 Press release 28 Sept. 2017, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_
IP-17-3441_en.htm (accessed 27 Feb. 2019), and the full Report:
‘Study and Reports on the VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States:
2017 Final report’, TAXUD/2015/CC/131.
12 Explanatory memorandum on the Proposal for a Council Directive
amending Directive 77/388/EEC as regards the place of supply of
services. COM (2003), 822 final, at 3 and 4.
13 OECD International VAT/GST Guidelines 2017, https://read.oecd-
i l ibrary .org / taxa t ion/ internat iona l -va t -gs t -gu ide l ines_
9789264271401-en#page4 (accessed 27 Feb. 2019), at 16.
14 See e.g. CJEU Apr. 10, C-309/06 (Mark & Spencer III), ECLI:EU:
C:2008:211; CJEU Sept. 19 2000, C-454/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:469.
15 See points 5, 13, 30 and 34 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28
Nov. 2006 on the common system of value added tax.
16 CJEU 19 July 2012, C-44/11 (Deutsche Bank AG), ECLI:EU:
C:2012:484; see also Giorgio Beretta, VAT and the Sharing
Economy, World Tax J. 395 (Aug. 2018).
17 M. M. W. D. Merkx, De woon- en vestigingsplaats in de btw, Deventer:
Kluwer 2011 Merkx 31–33 (2011).
18 OECD international VAT/GST guidelines on neutrality, Committee
on Fiscal Affairs 2011, at 8.
19 See Merkx, supra n. 17, at 82–83.
20 Ernst & Young LLP, Implementing the ‘destination principle’ to
intra-EU B2B supplies of goods. Feasibility and economic evalua-
tion study, 30 June 2015, TAXUD/2013/DE/319, at 13 and 80.
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which leads to small businesses bearing proportionally
higher VAT compliance costs than larger businesses.21
Therefore, it is not surprising that the European
Commission has been aiming for a long time to simplify
the VAT system (also specifically for Small and Medium
Enterprises (SME’s)22).
Clear rules ensure clarity for the entrepreneur.
Taxation in the Member State of residence would be
the best option for entrepreneurs in the context of sim-
plicity as they speak the language of this country and
they know the rules.23 Further harmonization is also a
measure that increases the administrative simplicity for
entrepreneurs. When for example VAT rates and exemp-
tions are the same in every country, it is less complicated
for taxpayers to apply the taxation rules of a different
country as they are identical to the rules in their own
country.24 Problems that foreign entrepreneurs have in a
Member State where they are not established and do not
have a fixed establishment can also be solved by the
One-Stop-Shop system. Only one VAT registration will
be required in the Member State of residence. It enables
taxpayers to comply with all VAT requirements in their
own country. Reverse charge schemes contribute to the
prevention of VAT registrations in other countries as
well.25 Limitation on reporting obligations will decrease
the administrative burden for taxpayers.
A report from the OECD26 points out that the highest
feasible levels of compliance by foreign suppliers are
likely to be achieved if compliance obligations in the
jurisdiction of taxation are limited to what is strictly
necessary for the effective VAT collection. Too complex
registration and compliance procedures may lead to non-
compliance.27 Non-compliant behaviour makes tax
auditing more difficult for tax authorities.28
2.4 Cash Flow Neutral
VAT is a tax on consumption paid, ultimately, by final
consumers and collected by businesses. This implies
that, in principle, businesses should not bear the burden
of the VAT itself. Therefore, there are mechanisms in
place that allow for a refund or credit of the VAT levied
on transactions between businesses (except for
businesses that make exempt supplies or are involved
in non-business activities). In the staged process of VAT
collection successive businesses are, in principle entitled
to deduct input VAT on purchases and account for out-
put VAT on sales.29 As a result, the VAT passes through
the supply chain and should, in theory, not be a cost to
businesses. However, due to timing differences, the
incoming and outgoing amounts of VAT can lead to a
surplus or a deficit for businesses. Or, as a cash flow is
the amount of money that moves in and out of a busi-
ness, a cash flow advantage or disadvantage. That’s why
businesses often try to manage their cash flow position
(particularly cross-border VAT refunds and domestic
VAT credits).30 Of course, tax authorities are also faced
with cash flow impacts in reversed order.
2.5 Easy to Audit
Tax authorities should be able to check the correct
application of the VAT rules. Auditing should not be
too difficult and the costs should not be too high. The
costs must also be in proportion to the revenues.
Auditing is easiest in the Member State where the taxable
event takes place. However, due to the ever increasing
cross-border trade within the European Union, audits
must also take place across borders. Exchange of infor-
mation and cooperation between Member States are
helpful in order to audit cross-border trade and VAT
collection.31 The European Commission is aware of this
and is therefore increasingly focusing on improving the
cooperation between the Member States.32 Recapitulative
statements are currently already mandatory in the case of
cross-border transactions in the European Union. These
statements allow tax authorities to follow the goods that
are being traded and to identify mismatches. As such,
reporting obligations can make it easier for tax autho-
rities to audit.
The OECD pays a lot of attention to tax audits as
well. At the end of 2017 it published a report on the
effective collection of VAT on cross-border sales. In this
report it advises tax authorities to facilitate international
administrative cooperation.33 Furthermore, the OECD
advocates the destination principle as the basic rule for
the application of the VAT to international trade.34
According to the OECD, depending on developments
in technology, automated systems may play a central
role in facilitating tax collection in the future.
Currently, it sees technology as a tool to support the
21 European Commission, Commission staff working document
impact assessment accompanying the document Proposal for a
Council Directive amending Directive 2006/112/EC on the com-
mon system of value added tax as regards the special scheme for
small enterprises, Brussels, 18 Jan. 2018, SWD(2018) 9 final, at 15.
22 See Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2006/112/
EC on the common system of value added tax as regards the special
scheme for small enterprises, Brussels, 18 Jan. 2018, COM(2018)
21 final.
23 Merkx, supra n. 17, at 92.
24 Merkx, supra n. 17, at 96.
25 Merkx, supra n. 17, at 91 and 94.
26 OECD, Mechanisms for the Effective Collection of VAT/GST When the
Supplier Is Not Located in the Jurisdiction of Taxation (Paris: OECD
Publishing 2017a).
27 OECD 2017a, at 20 and 34.
28 OECD 2017a, at 20–21 and 39–43.
29 OECD international VAT/GST guidelines on neutrality, Committee
on Fiscal Affairs 2011, at 3.
30 See Ernst & Young, Managing indirect tax refunds, https://www.ey.
com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-new-value-new-vision/$FILE/ey-
new-value-new-vision.pdf (accessed 27 Feb. 2019).
31 Merkx, supra n. 17, at 102 and 104.
32 See e.g. European Commission, Towards a single EU VAT area -
Time to act, Brussels, 30 Nov. 2017, COM(2017) 706 final.
33 OECD 2017a, at 3, 17 and 35.
34 OECD 2017a, at 12–13.
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operation of the existing collection regimes.35 The
OECD encourages tax authorities to allow the use of
electronic record keeping systems as business processes
have become increasingly automated. Tax authorities
can make use of reliable business records and account-
ing systems in order to acquire the information needed
(e.g. type, date and place of supply and VAT payable).36
Systems-based audits by means of business analytics
could also be used to read and validate the supplier’s
business information (e.g. IP address, billing address
and credit card) and to cross-match these data.37
2.6 Fraud Proof
VAT fraud is a big problem in the EU. With an estimated
VAT gap of EUR 152 billion a year within the EU, EUR
50 billion is ascribed to VAT fraud.38 The CJEU
describes what VAT fraud is in a number of cases.39
Technically VAT fraud is no more than the non-payment
of VAT where it should have been paid. Important is that
this is done with intent (in other words in case VAT is
not paid by accident or because the taxable person does
not have sufficient funds we won’t speak of VAT fraud).
The most persistent VAT fraud is carousel fraud. Because
the EU proposals for a definitive VAT system target this
type of fraud directly it is important to discuss the way
carousel fraud works here. We however do note that
other types of fraud are possible within the VAT system
and if one type of fraud is not possible anymore fraud
shifts to another type. It goes beyond the scope of this
article to discuss them all and we might even not be
aware of all types of VAT fraud going on.40
VAT carousel fraud, also known as Missing Trading
Intra-Community Fraud or simply MTIC fraud, in its
simplest form requires three parties (A, B and C) and
most likely high value goods with a compact volume or
services. To conceal the VAT fraud from the tax autho-
rities often more parties are used in the fraud supply
chain, including innocent businesses. However, irrespec-
tive of the length or complexity of the supply chain the
principle of the fraud is always the same.
In our example party A is established in the Netherlands
and supplies goods to party B established in Sweden. In
relation to the supply the goods are transported from the
Netherlands to Sweden. A’s supply therefore qualifies as an
intra-Community supply, meaning that A applies an
exemption with right the to deduct VAT. B is required to
report an intra-Community acquisition in Sweden where
he receives the goods. Party B can deduct the VAT due
because of the intra-Community acquisition in the same
VAT return. Party B then subsequently sells the goods to
party C, also established in Sweden, which qualifies as a
local supply in Sweden. B charges C Swedish VAT and C
will deduct this VAT in its VAT return. However in our
example party B is the fraudster. He will therefore not
report the intra-Community acquisition (and not deduct
the VAT due to intra-Community acquisition as well) and
not report the local Swedish supply. Instead he will dis-
appear with the VAT paid by party C in hand. To make it a
carousel fraud party C must supply the goods to party A
and then the fraud can start again.
Our example is a case where the fraud takes place with
actual goods or services. It is also possible that empty boxes
are used or that no transport of goods takes place at all, but
there is a paper carousel fraud (i.e. invoices are issued for
goods that have never been supplied).
The fraud is lucrative because of the exemption
applying in the A-B transaction followed by a local
supply that is subject to the general VAT rate. In its
Local supply
Intra-Community 
supply
A B
C
NL
Sweden
35 OECD 2017a, at 17 and 27.
36 OECD 2017a, at 46–47.
37 OECD 2017a, at 34.
38 See Press release 28 Sept. 2017, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-17-3441_en.htm (accessed 27 Feb. 2019), and the full
report Study and Reports on the VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member
States:2017 Final Report, TAXUD/2015/CC/131.
39 For example in CJEU 7 Dec. 2010, C-285/09 (R.), ECLI:EU:
C:2010:742, para. 49.
40 The authors refer to Marie Lamensch & Emanuele Ceci, VAT Fraud.
Economic Impact, Challenges and Policy Issues, Study requested by
the TAX3 Committee, Oct. 2018, in particular Ch. 2.
VAT AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE’S CROSSROADS
236 EC TAX REVIEW 2019/5
objective to address the VAT fraud the EU therefore
has two options: to effectively tax the intra-
Community supply by removing the exemption (as
is envisaged in the proposals for the definitive VAT
system) or by removing the VAT of the local supply
(as is envisaged in the temporary general reverse
charge rule). To address the VAT fraud now tax
authorities also have the power to refuse the entitle-
ment to the exemption or to the right to deduct VAT
to the fraudster and the persons involved in the
supply chain who knew or should have known of
the VAT fraud.41 Some Member States also have
rules for joint and several liability in place. The
CJEU however ruled that taxable persons can only
be held liable if they knew or should have known of
the VAT fraud.42
2.7 Relationship Between the Principles
It is important to take note of the relationship between the
principles described above. Sometimes these principles will
go hand in hand. For example taxation in the country of
consumption ensures neutrality too, because when taxing
in the country of consumption it doesn’t matter to the
consumer if he buys a product from a local or foreign
supplier. Sometimes these principles may collide. For
example taxation in the country of the supplier provides
for simplicity and is easy to audit, but infringes the princi-
ple of taxation in the Member State of consumption and
the neutrality principle. Consequently, when evaluating a
system the principles must be weighed taking into account
the importance of each principle.
In that respect we note that neutrality and taxation in
the country of consumption are two main objectives of
the VAT system. Cash flow neutrality supports the neu-
trality principle, but is not an objective in itself.43
Simplicity and easy to audit are not objectives in itself
either. They can be dealt with in different ways, for
example the Mini One Stop Shop (MOSS) to deal with
VAT obligations in other Member States and administra-
tive cooperation to deal with audits of taxable persons
established abroad. However the importance of these
two principles must not be underestimated. If mistakes
are made because the system is too complex and fraud is
easy because audits are too difficult to carry out taxation
in the country of consumption and neutrality will not be
achieved. Considering the yearly estimated lost amount
due to VAT fraud the level a system is susceptible to VAT
fraud is of importance as well.
3. THE CURRENT AND THE PROPOSED DEFINITIVE
VAT SYSTEM
3.1 How the Current System Works
The current European VAT system treats domestic and
cross-border transactions differently.44 Generally, VAT is
charged on goods and services supplied domestically,45
whereas goods and services supplied cross-border are free
of VAT.
In case of domestic supplies of goods and services, the
supplier charges local VAT to his customer. Depending on
the nature of his activities (economic/non-economic, tax-
able/exempt), the supplier has the right to recover input
VAT incurred. As a result, each individual supplier in the
supply chain effectively only pays the VAT due on the value
he added to the good/service (mechanism of fractioned
payment).46
In case of cross-border B2B supplies of goods under the
‘transitional’ arrangement the transaction is split into two
taxable events: the exempt or zero-rated intra-Community
supply performed by the supplier from the Member State
of departure of the goods, followed by an intra-Community
acquisition by the recipient in the Member State of arrival
of the goods. The recipient is liable to report and pay local
VAT in the Member State of arrival of the goods. However,
as the payment is shifted to the VAT return and this
payable VAT amount can be fully recovered in the same
VAT return (if the recipient has a full right to recover VAT),
the recipient acquired goods free of VAT. This opportunity
to acquire goods free of VAT makes VAT fraud within
international trade lucrative, as described in section 2.6.
3.2 How the Proposed System Works
Under the proposed definitive VAT system cross-border
B2B supplies of goods within the EU will be treated the
same as domestic supplies of goods. Whereas under the
current system the cross-border B2B supplies of goods is
split up in two taxable events, under the definitive system
there will only be one taxable event, the intra-Union supply
performed by the supplier. This intra-Union supply is
subject to VAT in the Member State of arrival of the
goods. As the one-stop-shop mechanism is extended to
include these intra-Union supplies, the supplier reports
and pays the VAT due in the country of arrival of the
goods via its VAT return in its country of establishment.
After the evaluation of the definitive VAT system for the
41 CJEU 6 July 2006, C-439/04 and C-440/04 (Kittel and Recolta),
ECLI:EU:C:2006:446, CJEU 7 Dec. 2010, C-285/09 (R.), ECLI:
EU:C:2010:742 and CJEU 18 Dec. 2014, C-131/13, C-163/13
and C-164/13 (Italmoda), ECLI:EU:C:2014:2455.
42 CJEU 11 May 2006, C-384/04 (Federation of Technological
Industries), ECLI:EU:C:2006:309.
43 In the end the supplier does not carry the burden of VAT, but he
might need to prefinance the VAT.
44 See Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social
Committee, On the follow-up to the Action Plan on VAT, Towards
a single EU VAT area – Time to act, Brussels, 4 Oct. 2017, COM
(2017) 566 final, at 3.
45 Except when the supply of the good or service is subject to an
exemption, is zero-rated or a domestic reverse charge mechanism
applies.
46 M. E. van Hilten & H. W. M van Kesteren, Omzetbelasting 14
(Deventer: Wolters Kluwer 2017) and R. A. Wolf, Carrouselfraude,
para. 1.2 (Den Haag: SDU uitgevers 2010, online).
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B2B cross-border supplies of goods, the European
Commission has the intention to extend this system to
the B2B supplies of services.47
The definitive system is complicated with different
rules for cross-border supplies of goods to so-called ‘cer-
tified taxable persons’ (‘CTPs’).48 In case the supplier is
not established in the Member State of arrival of the goods
and the customer is a CTP, no VAT is charged on the
supply. Instead, the CTP has to account for reverse charge
VAT. We refer to previous articles written by some of the
authors of this article for a more detailed explanation of
the proposed system.49
3.3 Testing the Current and Proposed System
3.3.1 Taxation in the Country of Consumption
In the current VAT system, taxation in the Member State
of destination (where the goods will most likely be con-
sumed) of the B2B cross-border supply of goods is
achieved by exempting the intra-Community supply
and taxing the intra-Community acquisition in the
Member State of arrival of the goods.
Although the mechanism is different, the cross-border
B2B supply of goods continues to be taxed in the country
of destination of the goods under the proposed system.
Under the proposed system it will be the supplier who
charges VAT of the Member State of destination. In case
the goods are supplied to a CTP, the CTP has to account
for reverse charge VAT in the Member State of destina-
tion of the goods.
3.3.2 Neutrality
A neutral VAT system requires goods to be subject to the
same VAT legislation regardless of their origin. This is
true under the current as well as the proposed system. As
described under (a) both the current and the proposed
system guarantee that VAT on the acquired goods is due
in the Member State of destination of those goods.
What’s more, compared to the current system the pro-
posed system is more neutral. Currently if a supplier
purchases goods domestically it needs to pay VAT to
the supplier and recover that VAT through the periodic
VAT returns. If the supplier purchases goods from a
supplier in another Member State the supply will be
exempt and the supplier can report and deduct the
VAT on the intra-Community acquisition in the same
VAT return. This means that by purchasing goods
abroad there is no cash flow effect. Intra-Community
purchases can therefore be preferred to domestic pur-
chases. Under the proposed system it doesn’t matter
whether goods are purchased domestically or coming
from another EU Member State. In each case local VAT
is charged and needs to be paid to the supplier by the
customer. The customer must recover this VAT through
its periodic VAT return. However if the supplier is not
established in the Member State where VAT is due and
the customer is a CTP VAT will still be reverse charged,
making it more interesting to purchase goods from sup-
pliers established abroad.
3.3.3 As Simple as Possible
With the completion of the internal market on 1 January
1993 the European Commission aimed to create ‘a more
favourable environment for stimulating enterprise, com-
petition and trade’.50 It was envisaged that the abolition
of customs procedures would reduce compliance costs
associated with intra-EU trade.51 However, the transi-
tional system replacing the customs procedures resulted
in an additional (compliance) burden, risks and legal
uncertainty for businesses involved in EU trade, thus
leading to higher costs. This transitional system is even
said to have led businesses to avoid EU trade.52
With the disappearance of the border controls,
administrative obligations were devised in order for
Member States to still be able to follow the goods circu-
lating through the EU. In this respect, businesses
involved in EU trade have to fulfil additional compliance
obligations (such as filing recapitulative statements for
the intra-Community supplies and/or acquisition of
goods). Furthermore, in order to be allowed to apply
the exemption for the intra-Community supply of goods,
the supplier is required to collect and retain proof that
the goods have left the Member State of dispatch and
check the status of its customer by verifying the custo-
mers VAT number.
The proposed rules have their own problems. Under
the proposed rules VAT is due in the Member State of
arrival of the goods, where it has to be paid by the
supplier. This means that suppliers must have
47 See Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social
Committee on an action plan on VAT, Towards a single EU VAT
area – Time to decide, Brussels 7 Apr. 2016, COM(2016) 148 final,
at 10 and COM (2017) 566 final, at 7. For some critical comments
on the scope of the extension of the system to B2B supplies of
services (not all exceptions to the main place of supply rule should
be abolished) see M. Merkx, J. Gruson, N. Verbaan & B. van der
Doef, Definitive VAT Regime: Stairway to Heaven or Highway to Hell?,
27(2) EC Tax Rev. 77 (2018).
48 COM (2017) 566 final, at 7.
49 Merkx, Gruson, Verbaan & van der Doef, supra n. 47, at 74–82 and
M. Merkx & J. Gruson, Definitive VAT regime: Ready for the Next
Step?, 28(3) EC Tax Rev. 136–49 (2019).
50 Completing the internal market, White paper from the Commission
to the European Council, Brussels 14 June 1985, COM(85), 310
final, at 4.
51 Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment,
Accompanying the document Proposal for a Council Directive
amending Directive 2006/112/EC as regards harmonizing and sim-
plifying certain rules in the value added tax system and introducing
the definitive system for the taxation of trade between Member
States, Brussels 4 Oct. 2017, SWD(2017) 325 final, at 27.
52 VAT expert group, VEG No 003, B2B supplies of goods – Taxation at
destination, Shortcomings of the current VAT system identified by
stakeholders, Brussels 27 Sept. 2012, taxud.c.1(2012)1325533 –
EN, at 6. VEG No 003, taxud.c.1(2012)1325533 – EN, at 3.
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knowledge of applicable rates, exemptions etc. in
Member States where they have customers. Considering
the European Commission’s proposal to give Member
States more freedom to determine for which goods and
services the reduced rate applies,53 this will become a
difficult task for businesses in the proposed system.
According to the European Commission the proposed
system will decrease compliance burdens with one bil-
lion euros. We however have doubts. The system seems
rather complicated to us and more complicated than the
current system for businesses to apply due to the fact
that they must apply the EU VAT rules of possibly
twenty-eight Member States. This will be mitigated to
some extent, because customers may have the CTP status
and will report the VAT due. However this is presented
as a temporary solution and requires taxable persons to
apply two different set of rules depending on their cus-
tomer’s status.
3.3.4 Cash Flow Neutral
Under the transitional system, the intra-Community
cross border B2B supplies of goods is cash flow
neutral for both businesses and the tax authorities
when the customer has a full right to recover input
VAT. Since the intra-Community supply is VAT
exempt and the VAT reported on the intra-
Community acquisition by the customer can be
recovered in the same VAT return, the intra-
Community transaction does not involve a payment
of VAT. In case the customer does not have a full
right to recover input VAT, there is a cash flow
advantage. The customer is not required to pay the
acquisition VAT at the moment he receives the goods,
the VAT payment only needs to be made within a
certain timeframe after the filing period.
Under the proposed system, VAT is charged on the
intra-Union supply of goods against the applicable VAT
rate in the Member State of arrival of the goods. This
involves considerable amounts of additional cash flow
among entrepreneurs, among tax authorities and
between entrepreneurs and tax authorities compared to
the current VAT system.54 Depending on their trade
profile, businesses will either have a cash flow advantage
or a cash flow disadvantage.55
3.3.5 Easy to Audit
Under the current system tax authorities audit local
business to check whether they paid VAT in their
Member State. In case of a suspected fraud they will
need to consult the tax authorities of the Member State
of destination or origin of the goods.
Under the proposed system, the tax authorities of
the Member State of dispatch of the goods have to
collect the VAT charged on the intra-Union supply,
accruing to the Member State of arrival of the goods.
The main issue for the tax authorities of the Member
State of dispatch of the goods is that they have to
assess whether businesses have applied the correct
VAT rate on supplies to other Member States. The
tax authorities of the Member State of dispatch practi-
cally have to enforce (and have knowledge of) VAT
rates of all Member States, posing them for serious
delimitation problems. The VAT rates proposal makes
matters even more complicated, as it provides Member
States with more freedom to set their VAT rates, lead-
ing to more rates diversification.56
The main issue for the tax authorities of the Member
State of arrival of the goods is that they have to rely
completely on the remittance of the VAT on the intra-
Union supply by businesses established in other Member
States (whom they cannot audit without the involvement
of the Member State of dispatch) and the assessment of
the tax authorities of those Member States of the correct-
ness thereof.57 As the administrative obligations for busi-
nesses relating to the cross border B2B supply of goods in
the EU are removed (i.e. filing recapitulative statements
for the intra-Community supplies and/or acquisition of
goods), the Member State of arrival also cannot monitor
the goods shipped to its country and the VAT due on
these goods. What’s more it must allow the deduction of
input VAT even though it may not yet have received the
VAT on the supply from the Member State of dispatch.
Consequently, the tax authorities have to work
together more closely under the proposed system and
assist each other with collecting VAT. The recently
approved measures to strengthen administrative coop-
eration in the field of VAT aim to provide tax autho-
rities with more instruments to do so (e.g. joint audit,
exchange of information without prior request).58 It
remains to be seen whether this is enough, since, as
Lamensch puts it ‘states naturally have little appetite to
mobilize resources to ensure the collection of taxes in
other states’.59 Furthermore, working together is not
53 Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2006/112/EC
as regards rates of value added tax COM/2018/020 final.
54 Letter of the State Secretary of Finance of 10 Nov. 2017, BZDOC-
1015490419-119, Fiche 5: Mededeling, richtlijn en verordening
betreffende een definitief BTW-systeem, at 7, Merkx, Gruson,
Verbaan & van der Doef, supra n. 47, at 82.
55 SWD(2017) 325 final, p. 61.
56 Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2006/112/EC
as regards rates of value added tax, Brussels 18 Jan. 2018, COM
(2018) 20 final and R. De La Feria, The Definitive VAT System:
Breaking with Transition, 3 EC Tax Rev. 125 (2018).
57 Compare: Marie Lamensch & Emanuele Ceci, VAT Fraud. Economic
Impact, Challenges and Policy Issues, Study requested by the TAX3
Committee, Oct. 2018, at 49.
58 Council regulation (EU) 2018/1541 of 2 Oct. 2018 amending
Regulations (EU) No 904/2010 and (EU) 2017/2454 as regards
measures to strengthen administrative cooperation in the field of
value added tax, OJ L 259, 16 Oct. 2018, at 1–11.
59 M. Lamensch, Is There Any Future for the Vendor Collection Model in
the 21st Century Economy?, Int’l VAT Monitor 183 (May/June 2016).
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only a matter of having the right instruments, but
education, knowledge, language and culture also play
a role.60
Although the above does not apply to supplies to
CTP’s, the CTP concept brings its own difficulties. The
tax authorities require structural additional capacity for
processing requests for the CTP status and monitoring
the status after it has been granted.61
3.3.6 Fraud Proof
The mechanism of fractioned payment ensures that, to a
certain level, VAT is self-enforcing and mitigates the effects
of fraud.62 It is self-enforcing in the sense that there is an
incentive for businesses to comply. Gains of fraud/evasion
are minimized to the VAT on the value added by that
business. Purchasers’ interests are opposed to that of sellers,
in the sense that there is no benefit for businesses to
purchase goods free of VAT (as they can (fully) reclaim
the input VAT charged). Should a business decide not to
remit the VAT due on their supplies the tax loss is mini-
mized to the value added in that last production phase.
However, under the current system this mechanism of
fractioned payments is broken when the goods are sup-
plied to a business in another Member State. As the
intra-Community supply is exempt with full recovery
of the input VAT incurred in respect of these goods,
the goods leave the country free of VAT. Unfortunately,
this happens ‘at a particularly vulnerable spot: the inter-
face of domestic and foreign tax administrations’,63 mak-
ing it more difficult to detect the fraud. Another element
of the VAT system that is utilized, in amongst others the
carousel fraud, is the fact that recovery of input VAT is
not linked to VAT actually being paid.64 In our example
mentioned in section 2.6, party C can in principle
reclaim the input VAT charged, but not remitted by
party B.
Under the proposed system this break in the mechan-
ism of fractioned payments is repaired, as the intra-Union
supply is subject to VAT. This removes the lucrativeness
of the carousel fraud as goods cannot be purchased VAT
free any longer, but it does not prevent exploitation of the
credit and refund system of VAT. Different types of fraud
may arise. For example a fraudster can buy goods in a
Member State that applies a low VAT rate on certain
goods (i.e. a Member State may apply a reduced rate
while another applies a general VAT rate or the Member
State has a low general VAT rate) and sell them to a
customer in a Member State that has a high rate on
these goods. When it does not report the supply it can
also not deduct the input VAT. However because the
input VAT is much lower than the output VAT, this
may still be lucrative. Especially in case of a high volume
of transactions. Hence, under the proposed system the
seller instead of the acquirer will become the missing
trader. What’s more, the chances to get away with the
fraud will increase, because the reaction by the tax autho-
rities in the Member State of consumption will be slower
and the latter’s means of action will be more limited,
because most of the relevant data and auditing powers
will be with the Member State of Identification.65 Under
the special regime for CTP’s, it is also still possible to
purchase goods VAT free, as the reverse charge mechan-
ism applies in that case. A CTP is supposed to be a
trustworthy taxpayer, but fraudsters will surely find their
way to use this concept to their benefit.66
4 GENERAL REVERSE CHARGE
4.1 How the System Works
Under the general reverse charge mechanism, the liabi-
lity for the payment of VAT on B2B transactions is
shifted from the supplier to the recipient in case of
domestic supplies.67 This implies that the supplier is
no longer responsible for the reporting and payment of
VAT in case the recipient is a taxable person for VAT
purposes. In the event the recipient has a full right to
deduct input VAT, he accounts for the VAT on the
purchase in his VAT return as output VAT and deducts
the same amount as input VAT. As a result, no actual
payment would be made to the tax authorities for the
supply. Only retailers (i.e. companies conducting busi-
ness to consumer (B2C) transactions) would actually
collect the VAT and are obliged to pay it to the tax
authorities.68 This approach is very different from the
current VAT system, in particular with respect to the
fractionated payment of VAT at the level of each eco-
nomic transaction.69 The VAT treatment of intra-
Community transactions remains the same.
60 J. Sanders jr., Een nieuwe start voor de btw, 46 BTW-bulletin (2016).
61 Letter of the State Secretary of Finance of 10 Nov. 2017, BZDOC-
1015490419-119, Fiche 5: Mededeling, richtlijn en verordening
betreffende een definitief BTW-systeem, at 8.
62 M. Keen & S. Smith, VAT Fraud and Evasion: What Do We Know,
and What Can be Done?, IMF Working Paper WP/07/31, at 6, 7 and
Wolf, supra n. 46, para. 2.5.
63 R. T. Ainsworth, Carousel Fraud in the EU: A digital VAT Solution,
Tax Notes Int’l 445 (1 May 2006).
64 Wolf, supra n. 46, para. 1.2.
65 Marie Lamensch & Emanuele Ceci, VAT Fraud. Economic Impact,
Challenges and Policy Issues, Study requested by the TAX3
Committee, Oct. 2018, at 49 and 50.
66 G. J. van Norden, Voorstellen voor ingrijpende Europese btw-hervor-
mingen, NTFR 2017/2908, J. Gruson & N. Verbaan, Voorstellen voor
het definitieve btw-stelsel: definitief een nieuw begin?, BTW-bulletin
2018/11, Merkx, Gruson, Verbaan & van der Doef, supra n. 47, at
82.
67 See also Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2006/
112/EC on the common system of value added tax as regards the
temporary application of a generalized reverse charge mechanism
in relation to supplies of goods and services above a certain thresh-
old, Brussels, 21 Dec. 2016, COM(2016) 811 final.
68 Robert F. van Brederode & Sebastion Pfeiffer, Combating Carousel
Fraud: The General Reverse Charge VAT, Int’l VAT Monitor 151
(May/June 2015).
69 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from
the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. A
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Currently the VAT Directive already gives the possibi-
lity to Member States to apply a reverse charge mechan-
ism to a limited number of transactions under specific
conditions (e.g. articles 199 and 199a VAT Directive).
On 21 December 2016, the European Commission
proposed an optional and temporary general reverse
charge on domestic B2B supplies of goods and services
when Member States meets certain conditions and when
the invoice exceeds the amount of EUR 10,000.70 It was
adopted by the EU Member States on 2 October 2018. In
the adopted proposal the monetary threshold has been
increased to EUR 17,500.71 Member States can only
request to apply the generalized reverse mechanism if
they meet strict conditions: e.g. they must have a VAT
gap of at least 5% above the EU median VAT gap, a level
of carousel fraud of 25% within that VAT gap and the
Member State in question establishes that other control
measures are not sufficient to combat carousel fraud as
well as the reasons why VAT administrative cooperation
has proven insufficient.
4.2 Testing the General Reverse Charge
4.2.1 Taxation in the Country of Consumption
Under the general reverse charge mechanism, the liability
to pay VAT is shifted from the supplier to the recipient in
the event of domestic B2B transactions. As a result, taxa-
tion still takes place in the Member State of residence of
the buyer, where the goods will also be consumed most of
the time. Therefore, there is no effect on taxation in the
country of consumption compared to the current system.
Under the proposed system, the VAT treatment of domes-
tic supplies doesn’t change. Hence, the VAT collection in
the country of consumption remains the same. As
described in section 3.2 both the exempt intra-
Community supply in the Member State of departure in
combination with the intra-Community acquisition taxed
in the Member State of destination (this will be main-
tained under the general reverse charge mechanism) and
the proposed intra-Union supply of goods leads to taxa-
tion in the Member State of destination. As a result, there
is no difference with regard to the place of taxation
compared to the current and proposed system.
4.2.2 Neutrality
As described the general reverse charge mechanism does
not affect the place of taxation and hence the neutrality
of the system compared to the current system is not
affected. Under the general reverse charge mechanism
both domestic and cross-border supplies are effectively
freed from VAT. Like under the proposed system where
both domestic and cross-border supplies are subject to
VAT, business will therefore not prefer purchases from
foreign suppliers over domestic purchases.
4.2.3 As Simple as Possible
In order to determine whether or not the reverse charge
mechanism has to be applied in domestic situations, the
supplier must verify the VAT status of all recipients. This
results in an increased burden compared to the current
situation and will therefore increase compliance costs.
Currently the status only has to be verified in case of
intra-Community supplies. Under the proposed system
both the VAT status and the CTP status have to be
validated in case of intra-Union transactions. In addition,
under the general reverse charge mechanism, the sup-
plier must be informed of the consumer’s purpose with
the goods (i.e. private or business use). This information
collection will likewise increase administrative burden
compared to the current system. Not to mention who
bears the risk of the correctness of this information.
The different VAT treatment of B2B and B2C transac-
tion will also lead to different invoices. As a result,
suppliers should have an administrative system that is
able to make this distinction. This will increase the
compliance costs as well. The retail sector (mostly
SMEs) will be confronted with the biggest burden as
they will in most cases be responsible for the collection
of the VAT due on the B2C transactions. A monetary
threshold, as mentioned is section 4.1 would be bene-
ficial for SMEs, but will also make the system more
complex as the current system will remain applicable
to invoices with a value below the monetary threshold
and the reverse charge system will apply to invoices with
a value that exceeds the threshold.
Besides, to overcome the disappearance of the frac-
tioned payments, compensatory reporting obligations
(e.g. periodic customer list, value of the supplies and
VAT identification numbers) could be introduced that
allow for basic crosschecking of the information stem-
ming from suppliers and acquirers. This would enable
the tax authorities to monitor the transactions and to
identify mismatches. These reporting obligations alone
would represent some significant one-off costs for intro-
duction as well as recurrent costs for businesses.72
strategy to improve the operation of the vat system within the
context of the internal market, Brussels, 7 June 2000, COM
(2000) 348 final, at 13; International VAT Association, Combating
VAT Fraud in the EU – The Way Forward 22–23 (Mar. 2007).
70 Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2006/112/EC
on the common system of value added tax as regards the temporary
application of a generalized reverse charge mechanism in relation to
supplies of goods and services above a certain threshold, Brussels,
21 Dec. 2016, COM(2016) 811 final, at 3 and 7–10.
71 Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2006/112/EC
on the common system of value added tax as regards the temporary
application of a generalized reverse charge mechanism in relation to
supplies of goods and services above a certain threshold,
Interinstitutional File: 2016/0406(CNS).
72 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from
the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on
measures to change the VAT system to fight fraud, Brussels 22 Feb.
2008, COM(2008) 109 final, at 8.
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Recapitulative statements are already mandatory in the
case of cross-border transactions in the European Union.
A general reverse charge VAT system will possibly apply
them in purely domestic situations as well.73 Intra-Union
supplies of goods should no longer be included in the
recapitulative statements under the proposed system.
In addition, currently the supplier is responsible for
VAT payment. This VAT responsibility is limited ‘only’ to
the correct VAT payment for the portfolio of provided
services or supplied goods. This is usually a limited
group of similar types of products. However, under the
reverse mechanism this might change considerably. The
recipient can become liable for the VAT payment of a
significantly larger and more diverse range of different
types of goods and services, depending on the number of
different types of goods that are purchased. In case the
recipient has a full right to deduct input VAT the impact
would only be an accounting one. The real increase in
burden will arise for businesses which do not have a full
right to deduct VAT as some of them may be liable for
VAT payment for the first time. For these entities there
would be a significant increase of administrative and
compliance costs compared to the current system.74
Under the proposed system the recipient will only be
liable for the VAT payment in case of cross-border sup-
plies of goods within the European Union provided that
he is a CTP and the supplier is not established in the
Member State of destination.
4.2.4 Cash Flow Neutral
Under the current VAT system the supplier is liable for
the payment of VAT. In a domestic situation, he will
charge the recipient VAT. When the recipient has a (full)
right to deduct input VAT, he can (partly) deduct the
input VAT in its periodic VAT return. It is offset against
the (possible) output VAT. Under the general reverse
charge system, taxpayers no longer have to pre-finance
the VAT as there would be no disparities anymore
between the moment of payment and recovery of VAT.
In case of B2B transactions there is no need to pay VAT
at all when the taxpayer has a full right to deduct VAT.
This is comparable with the current system of intra-
Community acquisitions in cross-border situations.
However, in B2C situations, the introduction of a general
reverse mechanism may have a substantial impact on the
cash flow position of retailers when using an invoice
based accounting system. Since (almost) the entire remit-
tance takes place in this part of the chain, it is possible
that enormous amounts have to be pre-financed or are
already received (in case the recipient pays earlier than
the moment the VAT has to be paid to the tax
authorities). The proposed system is based on the prin-
ciple that the supplier is liable for charging and collect-
ing the VAT of the Member State of destination. This
entails that the recipient may have to pre-finance the
input VAT since he can no longer directly deduct the
VAT due as input tax, as is possible with the intra-
Community acquisition. There is also a cash flow impact
for the supplier as intra-Community supplies are cur-
rently exempt from VAT. This is not the case when the
customer is a CTP and the supplier is not established in
the Member State of the customer. In that case the VAT
is reverse charged to the buyer. Altogether, the general
reverse charge system is more cash flow neutral than the
current and the proposed system, except for the last link
in the supply chain. The flip side, of course, is that tax
authorities will receive less fractionated VAT payments
through the production chain. Conversely, they will
receive higher amounts at the end of it.
4.2.5 Easy to Audit
The rule of thumb in all Member States is that 80% of
the VAT is paid by less than 10% of the taxable persons.
This means that very little control effort has to be
invested by Member States’ tax authorities to be guaran-
teed the bulk of their VAT revenue.75 However, under
reverse charge, the bulk of the VAT would be payable by
retailers who in many countries may be small and may
have less knowledge and resources than the small num-
ber of large businesses that currently pay a large propor-
tion of the VAT in most Member States. This increases
the chance of making mistakes. Besides that, larger com-
panies are most of the time more willing to be compliant.
Moreover, the identification of taxable persons would be
even more crucial than under the current system as no
VAT will be levied in domestic B2B situations. This
would require additional efforts and resources. Finally,
general control of all businesses needs to be maintained
in order to avoid diversion of goods and services to the
black economy.76
As mentioned under (c), recapitulative statements in
both domestic and cross-border situations might be
needed in order to monitor the transactions and to
identify mismatches. As a result, tax authorities have to
audit more statements.
The above leads to the conclusion that the general
reverse charge system is less easy to audit than the
current system. The proposed system intends to benefit
from reliable taxable persons, hence it has introduced
the CTP status with additional simplifications. However,
these persons can still be fraudsters and they should
therefore continue to be monitored in our opinion.
73 van Brederode & Pfeiffer, supra n. 68, at 154.
74 Petr Toman, Reverse Charge in VAT – Possibilities and Limitations, in
Ministry of Finance of the Czech Republic, Closing VAT GAP
Through Reverse Charge Mechanism 47–48 (Prague, Dec. 2015).
75 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from
the Commission to the Council in accordance with Art. 27(3) of
Directive 77/388/EEC, Brussels, 19 July 2006 COM(2006) 404
final, at 4.
76 Commission of the European Communities 2008, at 8–9.
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Nevertheless, this would in the authors’ opinion be
easier than auditing all the retailers under the general
reverse charge system.
4.2.6 Fraud Proof
We believe that the general reverse charge system will
significantly reduce carousel fraud or missing trader
fraud as no actual payments of VAT take place in the
supply chain. Payment and reclaim of VAT are made by
the same person and the ‘missing trader’ has no VAT
liability. Only the B2C transaction results in an actual
payment of VAT. Besides that, the fraud cannot shift to
other types of goods as can happen with the current
reverse charges for specific goods or services (e.g. article
199a VAT Directive). This is because the general reverse
charge system applies to all domestic B2B supplies
of goods. A monetary threshold, as mentioned in sec-
tion 4.1 would not be beneficial for the prevention of
fraud as it will weaken the general reverse charge system.
However, there is also a risk of new types of fraud.
For example, consumers may try to pose as taxable
persons in order to be granted access to supplies without
VAT. However, this problem is not new and not caused
by the general reverse charge system per se. It also
happens under the current system.77 Business owners
may also be tempted to purchase goods for private use
through their business in order to save VAT. This pro-
blem is not new either and exists already under the
current system also.78 A possible solution may be the
formulation of a definition of consumer products whose
nature is highly indicative of private use, enumerating
particular characteristics. When the definition is met, the
supplier would not be able to make tax-free or reverse
charge supplies on the basis of only the VAT identifica-
tion number, but should also acquire other information
sufficient to demonstrate business use.79 However, this
will increase administrative burden.
Further, the general reverse charge mechanism is not
an answer to black sales and may generate other types of
consumption fraud, like false statements about the cus-
tomer’s VAT status and the hijacking of VAT identifica-
tion numbers at the retail level (in order to avoid the
supplier having to charge VAT and to allow goods to
enter into the black market free of VAT).80
Finally, under the reverse charge mechanism VAT is in
general always paid by the last entity in the chain (i.e.
retailers). When fraud takes place in the last link of the
supply chain, the full amount of VAT will be stolen, which
tempts to commit the fraud. However, this non-payment of
VAT can also happen unintentionally (e.g. incorrect settings
of the supplier’s system).81
Also under the proposed system it is to be expected
that fraudsters will find new ways to commit fraud.
Moreover, carousel fraud can still take place under this
system in CTP situations as no VAT will be paid when
the goods cross borders and subsequent domestic taxed
supplies can take place. Furthermore, taxable persons
can show compliant behaviour at first in order to obtain
the CTP status, after which they become fraudulent
again.82
5 COMPARISON AND CONCLUSION
We summarize our findings from section 3 and 4 in the
table below.
Proposed
system General reverse charge
Compared to
current system
Compared to
current system
Compared to
proposed
system
Taxation in
country of
consumption
0 0 0
Neutral + + 0
As simple as
possible to
apply
- - 0
Cash flow
neutral
- + +
Easy to audit - - -
Fraud proof + + +
As the table shows both systems have benefits compared
to the current system, but also downsides as regards in
particular simplicity and audits. The systems also have
up and downsides when compared to each other. The
comparison in particular paints the general picture that
in order to make the system more fraud proof there will
be an increase of compliance burdens and audit costs.
This stresses in the authors’ view the dilemma that we
are facing when choosing to implement a new system.
The authors therefore conclude that keeping the current
system while at the same time addressing VAT fraud
within EU trade with the development of technological
solutions may be the way forward, not right or left on the
VAT crossroads, but straight on!
On a final note the authors’ would like to remark
that VIVAT is in their opinion an alternative that
77 van Brederode & Pfeiffer, supra n. 68, at 153.
78 van Brederode & Pfeiffer, supra n. 68, at 154.
79 European Commission, Guidelines resulting from the 93rd meet-
ing, Document B, 1 July 2011, taxud.c.1(2012)389021 – 708; van
Brederode & Pfeiffer, supra n. 68, at 154.
80 Fabrizio Borselli, Pragmatic Policies to Tackle VAT Fraud in the
European Union, Int’l VAT Monitor 341 (Sept./Oct. 2008).
81 Toman, supra n. 74, at 46–47.
82 See also Madeleine Merkx, John Gruson, Naomie Verbaan & Bart
van der Doef, Definitive VAT Regime: Stairway to Heaven or Highway
to Hell?, 27(2) EC Tax Rev. 74–82 (2018).
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mitigates the downsides of both the proposed system
and the general reverse charge mechanism and further
research on this option is of interest. Under Viable
Integrated VAT (VIVAT) all B2B supplies of goods
are subject to one common VAT rate within the EU.
The supplier remits this VAT to the tax authorities in
its own Member State and can deduct this VAT as well
regardless if this VAT was charged by a local supplier
or a foreign supplier. B2C transactions remain under
the autonomy of Member States. The local VAT rates
apply on these transactions. The VIVAT reduces the
opportunity for VAT fraud within B2B-transactions
compared to the proposed system. Due to the com-
mon rate on B2B-transactions fraudsters can’t use rate
differences to their advantage as described in section
3.3 (f). Taxation of cross-border transactions instead of
applying an exemption, like under the current system,
makes VIVAT more fraud proof. It is also simpler to
apply than the proposed system, because suppliers
don’t need to have knowledge of other EU Member
States’ VAT legislation to apply the correct VAT
regime. Audits are also much easier within VIVAT. A
taxable person that performs B2B transactions only can
be audited on the correct application of the VIVAT by
the tax authorities of its own Member State.83
Compared to the reverse charge system, under the
VIVAT the fractioned payment of VAT is still main-
tained. This means that the collection of VAT is
already guaranteed in chains of the supply chain pre-
ceding the B2C supply and tax authorities can focus
on larger suppliers to ensure the collection of VAT
too. The impact assessment of the European
Commission shows that VIVAT has been considered
as an option but was discarded because of the require-
ment of a clearing mechanism and adjustments in the
Member State of destination.84 We however do not see
a big difference between clearing and the proposed
system where Member States have to collect each
other’s VAT and transfer it to each other. Another
issue that the authors note is that special attention
must be given to B2B transactions with taxable per-
sons that do not have a full right to deduct VAT or
also have non-economic activities. They can be dealt
with in two manners: (1) treat them as consumers or
(2) require them to pay or refund them the difference
between the VAT rate in their Member State and the
VIVAT rate. By setting the VIVAT rate 1% higher than
the highest VAT rate in the EU one can create an
incentive for these taxable persons to remit local VAT
and get a refund of the VIVAT.85
83 However there can be issues as regards audits. For example, in case
an exporter has paid too little VIVAT an upward adjustment of the
exporting state will only result in an increasing amount of VAT to
be paid to the other Member State. There is therefore a sufficient
amount of trust necessary between Member States and coordination
to deal with too high refund claims or too low VAT payments.
However a similar situation occurs in the proposed system since
Member States collect VAT for other Member States. Jan van der
Bijl, The Cockfield Proposals – A European Business and Industry View,
4 Intertax 134 (1989) and Christian Amand, The 2016 European
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